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2 
Readers of the Human Development Report  [HDR], published periodically by the United  
Nations Development Programme [ UNDP], tend to have mixed feelings. The pessimistic rhetoric of  
the HDR seems to be contradicted by its own numbers. In fact, when weighed up in human  
development terms, developing countries tend to fare better relative to advanced countries than  
in per capita income terms.  
It is the purpose of this essay to bridge the gap between the empirical evidence on human  
development and the HDR rhetoric by providing a new, ‘i mproved’index [IHDI, hereafter], 
informed by welfare econom ics.
2 
 The IHDI is presented here along the UNDP ’s HDI [UNHDI, 
henceforth] for the world and its main regions over the period 1870-2005.  
What defines the new human development index? In the first place, its social, non-income  
dimensions are derived using a convex achievement function as an alternative to the linear  
transformation employed in the UNHDI. Thus, in the new index, as a social indicator reaches  
higher levels, its increases represent higher achievements than if the same increase would take  
place at a lower level, while in the  UNDP linear transformation the same change results regardless  
the starting level. Secondly, in an attempt to reduce substitutability among the index components,  
its three dimensions (longevity, access to knowledge, and average incomes) are combined into the  
new IHDI using a geometric average, rather than the arithmetic average used in the  UNHDI . The 
final outcome is a new human development index which, by not concealing the gap between rich 
and poor countries, casts a much less optimistic view than the one provided by conventional  
UNDP index while satisfies the HDR concern for international differences. 
The paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 assesses the  UNHDI and exposes its main  
shortcomings. In an attempt to provide a response to these objections Section 3 presents the new  
IHDI . Then, world trends in human development since the late nineteenth century, derived from  
both the IHDI and the UNHDI, are compared in Section 4. Some concluding remarks complete the  
paper. 
2 
 Welfare economics is meant here in a broad sense and not restricted to conventional ‘welfare economics’.  
3 
Assessing the Human Development Index 
Challenging GDP (or GNP) per head as a measure of welfare, in spite of its advantage as a  
synthetic index and the observed association between economic growth and welfare (Lewis 1955, 
Beckerman 1993), has been recurrent since the spread of national accounts more than half a  
century ago (United Nations 1954, Dasgupta 1993, Engerman 1997, Fleurbaey 2009). Different 
socio-economic indicators have been explored as an alternative to GDP per head among which the  
Basic Needs approach and the Physical Index of Quality of Life are widely known.
3 
 The UNHDI, a 
synthetic product of the United Nations Development Programme, published annually since 1990,  
has been the latest addition to these social welfare measures. Although, in this occasion, the index  
has reached beyond academic borders, as a measure of well-being the  UNHDI has not escaped 
4  strong criticism .  
Human development was originally defined as ‘a process of enlarging people’s choices’that  
enables them ‘to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to  
resources needed for a decent standard of living’ (UNDP 1990: 10). In other words, human  
development emphasizes positive freedom (Desai 1991: 356). As a synthetic measure of human  
development, the UNHDI tries to capture a country’s achievements in longevity, knowledge and  
standard of living through various indices: the relative achievement in life expectancy at birth, in  
education, and in ‘all dimensions of human development not reflected in a long and healthy life 
and in knowledge’for which the adjusted percapita GDP (its logarithm) is a surrogate (UNDP,  
2001: 240). These achievements provide individuals the freedom to choose (Kakwani 1993,  
Fleurbaey 2009) and, thus, the opportunity ‘to lead lives they have reasons to value’ (Sen 1997).  
Indices for each dimension ( I) are computed according to the following formula,  
I = (x - Mo ) / (M - Mo ), [1] 
Where x is the observed value of a given dimension of welfare, and  Mo and M represent  
the maximum and minimum values, or goalposts. Goalposts representing levels not reached yet  
3 
 Cf. Adelman and Morris (1967), Beckerman (1966), Beckerman and Bacon (1966), Ehrlich (1969), Heston (1973),  
Hicks and Streeten (1979), Larson and Wilford (1979), Morris (1979), Streeten  et al. (1981), McGranahan et al. (1985), 
Ram (1982). 
4 
 The human development index has been received favourably, though uncritically, among economic historians who 
perceive it as a ‘retrospective index of welfare’ (Costa and Steckel 1997: 73-4) and have been adapted it imaginatively  
to the available evidence (Steckel and Floud 1997, Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998). 
4 
and below the present’s lowest level, respectively, were chosen for each indicator in order to  
make possible comparisons over time.
5 
 Each dimension ranges, thus, between 0 and 1. The UNHDI  
is obtained as the unweighted arithmetic average of the three dimension indices.  
Reactions to non-conventional indicators of well-being have always been critical. One of  
the most popular synthetic indices,  Morris’s (1979) Physical Quality of Life Index [PIQL] (an 
unweighted average of normalized indices of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy) was 
seriously questioned on the basis of the high collinearity between its first two components 
(Hopkins 1991) and has only made an uncritical comeback in the historical literature (Federico and  
6  Toniolo 1991, Domínguez and Guijarro 2000) .  
The UNHDI, presumably an improvement on Morris’s PQLI, has been seriously questioned  
(Dasgupta 1993: 77 ).
7 
 Srinivassan (1994: 240), for example, described the new index as  
‘conceptually weak and empirically unsound, involving serious problems of noncomparability over 
ti me and space’, while Dowrick et al . (2003) stressed its lack of welfare economics foundations.  
Moreover, the distribution of each dimension of the index is not taken into  account. 
8 
 
Furthermore, the weakness of the data underlying  UNHDI (incomplete coverage, measurement  
errors, and biases) has been highlighted as a major shortcoming of the new index (Srinivassan  
1994). 9  GDP per head estimates for developing countries are highly questionable (Heston 1994).  
Moreover, literacy and enrolment data are frequently non homogeneous making comparisons  
difficult.10  Lastly life expectancy data tends to be interpolated and often obtained through life  
tables’ projection rather than through direct estimation.
11 
 
5 
 For life expectancy at birth the maximum and the minimum values are established at 85 and 25 years, respectively. 
For education, the maximum and minimum are 100 and 0. The education index combines adult literacy and gross  
enrolment (primary, secondary and tertiary), with two-thirds and one-third weights, respectively. In the case of per 
capita GDP, a logarithmic transformation is imposed to allow for its assumed diminishing returns in terms of human  
development, and the maximum and minimum values are the logarithms of 40,000 and 100 dollars, respectively.  
6 
 Mazumdar (1999) has, nonetheless, widened the PQLI index to include other social dimensions in an attempt to  
measure the quality of life.  
7 
 The nature of its sponsor, its world coverage, and its annual availability suggest, however, that the HDI may last  
longer than previous attempts at assessing well-being.  
8 
 Thus, the HDI adds up social indicators for various domains of individual well-being but does not derive an aggregate  
of individual indices (Fleurbaey 2009: 1055). Hicks (1997) and Grimm  et al. (2008) provide alternative human  
development measures allowing for income distribution.  
9 
 Unfortunately, most of these shortcomings tend to be unavoidable in historical studies. 
10 
 That is, the age coverage differs widely (figures for population above 7, 10, or 15 years old are simultaneously used)  
and often the literate population includes those who can read but cannot write. Similarly, enrolment figures are  
5 
Major critical issues of the human development index are: How to transform the original  
values of social dimensions into indices? Should a linear or a non-linear transformation be used?  
Do human development dimensions (longevity, education and income) provide different insights  
of welfare, or are they simply redundant? If they capture different welfare dimensions, should  
equal weights be allocated to each dimension and kept unaltered over time? How to combine the  
main dimensions of well-being? Is an arithmetic average the appropriate procedure?
12 
The choice of UNHDI’s components has provoked an endless debate. For example, the 
inclusion of average incomes in the index of human development raises two distinctive issues. On  
the one hand, if those dimensions of human development  ‘not reflected in a long and healthy life 
and in knowledge’ need to be considered, why is income per head chosen as a proxy? Is it just  
because of its availability? On the other hand, why imposing a diminishing marginal utility on  
income? Against the view that a decent standard of living does not require unlimited income it has  
been opposed that‘additional income above the threshold can allow more human development’  
(Gormely 1995: 264) and that it is only above a given threshold that per capita income becomes  
relevant for human development (Sagar and Najam 1998: 253-4). Furthermore, it has been argued  
that a non-modified GDP per head  ‘may be appropriate for long run welfare comparisons if the  
focus is broader than just the escape from  poverty’ (Crafts 1997: 304). In the case of education, it  
is commonly accepted that, for developing countries, literacy is an essential element of human  
development, but it becomes meaningless for developed countries, when literacy rates are close  
to 100 percent (See, for example, Lind 2004). Fortunately, a wider range of variation is permitted 
by the aggregate enrolment rate for primary, secondary, and tertiary education, also a component  
of the UNHDI educational dimension. 
The aggregation of each dimension into a synthetic index has provoked some adverse  
reactions. For example, Kakwani (1993) and Aturupane  et al. (1994) suggested the use of socio- 
incomplete as the non-public sector is usually neglected. Moreover, comparability between very different writing 
systems (Chinese ideograms versus western alphabet, for example) is fraught with difficulties (Lind 2004).  
11 
 It can be argued, however, that life tables’ projections can be superior to imperfectly collected data on life  
expectancy. 
12 
 An additional worry derives from the fact that the HDI combines stock and flow variables. It has been suggested that  
if an annual index is required as a measure of progress, it should be computed on annual basis with flow data and  
preferably taking into account yearly changes in percapita income, in infant mortality and in school enrolment  
(Atu ru pane et al. 1994: 246). 
6 
economic indicators separately, while Dasgupta and Weale (1992) proposed an ordinal rather than  
cardinal measure of well-being, which was also made more inclusive by incorporating civil and  
political liberties.  
Does each UNHDI component measure a different aspect of well-being, or is it highly  
correlated to the rest of  them ?
13 
 Previous attempts to derive alternative welfare indices to  
conventional GDP per head suffered from either a high correlation with GDP, or were obtained  
from highly correlated components that rendered them redundant. There has been some outright 
rejection of the UNHDI. For example, McGillivray (1991: 1467), after stressing the positive  
correlation among the index’s individual components, concluded that the UNHDI was‘yet another 
redundant composite intercountry development  indicator’. Away of establishing whether the  
indicators included under the umbrella of human development did capture different aspects of  
well-being has been to use Principal Components Analysis  (PCA). 
14 
 . PCA allows one to establish  
whether the human development index attributes are redundant or add information on different 
facets of well-being.
15 
 This way it was found that the three dimensions contained in the  UNHDI  
belonged to the same component and, therefore, the simultaneous use of the three attributes is  
justified despite its high cross-correlation (UNDP 1993: 109-110).
16 
 
The weighting system is a major objection to the  UNHDI (Hopkins 1991, Booysen 2002).  
Should each dimension (longevity, education, and income) receive the same weights in the index 
over space and ti me ?
17 
 This choice finds support in the notion that each of them is equally  
essential in determining its level, a feature considered to be a main attribute of the human  
13 
 ‘If they are mutually orthogonal, then each measures an aspect of development unrelated to that measured by any  
other. At the other extreme, if they are  perfectly correlate with each other, then all indicators measure the same 
aspect’ (Srinivasan 1994: 240).  
14 
 PCA is a statistical technique for transforming a large set of variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables 
that accounts for most of the variation in the original variables. The principal components are linear combinations of  
the original variables with characteristic vectors of the correlation matrix of original variables as weights. The first 
principal component captures the largest proportion of the variation in the original set of variables.  
15 
 See Ram (1982) for a pioneering use of PCA to computing the Physical Index of Quality of Life. Also, see Ogwang 
(1994), Ogwang and Abdou (2003), and Lai (2000).  
16 
 Cf. Chakravarty (2003). This conclusion contradicts Ogwang (1994) who used PCA to identifya single variable (life  
expectancy) which best represents the three constituent elements of the HDI and, hence, to eliminate the problem of  
arbitrary choice of weights.  
17 
 Kelley (1991: 319) argued that the ‘production-transformation between income per capita and other human  
development indicators may be nonlinear, and thus might justify unequal or even variable weights by income level’.  
7 
development concept (Sagar and Najam 1998:  25 1).
18 
 However, it has been argued, UNHDI 
weights are based on judgment rather than on welfare economics (Dowrick et al . 2003: 504). A  
substantive objection to the use of fixed weights is that the relative values of the index  
components are not necessarily the same across countries (or individuals) and over time  
(Srinivassan 1994: 240). Historical evidence on the relationship between life expectancy and  per 
capita income lends support to this assertion (Preston 1975). 19 Modern economic growth 
predated improvements in life expectancy but the latter spread more rapidly (Easterlin 1999). A 
technical solution is offered by PCA. Its results provide optimal weights for each HDI component 
over time by weighting attributes by their  variance 
20 
 and, counter-intuitively, suggest stable one-
third weights for each dimension of the  index. 
21 
An additional difficulty is that attainments in each component are traded off against each  
other but these trade offs are not explicit. A close examination of the implicit trade offs offers  
some surprising results. For example, the implicit monetary valuation of an extra year of life  
expectancy rises dramatically with income as, by construction, the  UNHDI implicitly values life 
22 relatively less in poor than in rich countries .  
Is the unweighted arithmetic average of all dimensions (longevity, education and income)  
an acceptable way to derive a synthetic human development index? It has been noted that  
additivity over these attributes implies perfect substitution, which contradicts the notion that each  
dimension is equally crucial in determining the level of human development. Hence, it has been  
suggested that the substitutability among the index components should be restricted through  
their geometric average (Desai 1991: 356, Sagar and Najam 1998: 251-2) since with a 
18  This choice has been justified as human development is a concept that goes beyond the utilitarian calculus  
deliberately (Desai 1991: 354).  
19 
 Preston (1975: 236-7) stressed that the relationship between life expectancy and GDP per head shifted upwards 
over the twentieth century, and countries attained higher life expectancy at lower income levels as time went by. 
20 
 The variances of the principal components are equal to the associated characteristic roots. The proportion of the  
variation ascribed to a particular principal component is obtained by dividing the associated characteristic root by the 
sum of all the characteristic roots.  
21 
 Cf. UNDP (1993) and Ogwang (1994).  
22 
 The striking trade off between per capita income and longevity arises ‘from the fact that the marginal effect on the 
HDI of longer life is a constant’, while at the same time, ‘the marginal effect of extra income falls very sharply as  
income increases’ (Ravallion 1997: 633). Such a result is supported by the results obtained by Dowrick et al. (2003:  
525) who argue that ‘life expectancy in many parts of the world could be extended at a surprisingly low cost’.  
However, they criticize the UNHDI for implicitly valuing ‘life expectancy above its opportunity cost’.  
8 
multiplicative procedure the human development index will only experience a significant 
improvement if each of its dimensions does  it.  
How should the original values of social dimensions be transformed into well-being  
indices? An objection to the linear transformation of the original values in the  UNDP approach to  
human development was made by Srinivassan (1994: 240) who pointed out that ‘the ‘intrinsic’  
value of a single ‘functioning’, namely, the ability to live a healthy life, is not captured by its linear  
deprivation measure in UNHDI, since a unit decrease in the deprivation in life expectancy at an  
initial life expectancy of, say, 40 years is not commensurate with the same unit decrease at 60  
years’.  
The non linearity of the relationship between the value of each social indicator and its 
achievement, so that the observed differences in the levels of social indicators do not reflect their 
true achievement, has been thoroughly explored by Kakwani (1993), who stressed that social  
indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, or literacy have, in opposition to GDP per head,  
asymptotic limits, reflecting physical and biological maxima.  
Using an axiomatic approach Kakwani (1993) constructed a normalized index from an  
achievement function in which an increase in the standard of living of a country at a higher level  
implies a greater achievement than had it been the case if it occurred at a lower  leve l
23,  
f (x, Mo, M) = (( M - Mo ) 
1-r – ( M – x) 
1-6 ) / (( M - Mo ) 
1-F), for 0 <F <1 [2] 
= f (x, Mo , M) = (log ( M - Mo) – l og (M – x)) / log (M - Mo ), for F =1 [3] 
Where x is an indicator of a country’s standard of living, M and Mo are the maximum and  
minimum values, respectively, and log stands for the natural logarithm. The achievement function  
proposed by Kakwani (1993: 314) is a convex function of  x, and it is equal to 0, if x = Mo, and equal 
to 1, if x = M, ranging, then, between 0 and 1.  
In fact, the UNHDI represents a particular case, for s = 0, which yields expression [1] for  
each dimension of the index. Such particular case does not satisfy, however, one of the axioms of  
the achievement index defined by Kakwani, namely, that the index should give greater weight to  
the improvement of a country which has higher level for each social indicator. This axiom follows 
23 
 For example, in the case of longevity,  ‘a further increase must be regarded as a greater achievement than an equal 
increase at lower levels of longevity, ...the achievement must increase at a faster rate than the  longevity’ (Kakwani 
1993: 313). 
9 
‘from the belief that as the standard of living reaches progressively higher limits, incremental  
improvement should require much greater resources than similar incremental improvements from  
a lower base’ (Kakwani 1993: 312).  
Nonetheless, Kakwani’s rationale can be challenged, for example, on the basis that an  
‘i mprovement in education attainment may not be more difficult as the level of education  
becomes higher and higher’ (Tsui 1996: 302). In fact, Noorbakhsh (1998) modified the human  
development index by extending the principle of diminishing returns to education (but not to  
longevity). The rationale is that  ‘under similar conditions the early ‘units’ of educational  
attainments to a country should be of much higher value than the last  ones’ (Noorbakhsh 1998:  
519). Such assertion implies that the ethical and measurement aspects seem to be at odds in the  
human development index. However, as Dasgupta (1990: 23) rightly pointed out,  
‘Equal increments are possibly of less and less ethical worth as life expectancy rises to 65 or  
70 years and more. But we are meaning performance here. So it would seem that it becomes  
more and more commendable if, with increasing life expectancy, the index were to rise at the  
margin. The idea here is that it becomes more and more difficult to increase life expectancy as life  
24 expectancy rises’ .  
Therefore, the acceptance of Noorbakhsh’s ethical argument for a  ‘modified’ index would  
distort the measurement of performance, which is my main purpose here, by reducing the index  
variance of across countries and imposing, hence, artificial convergence across countries. 
25 
 Such a 
constraint on the index dispersion would only make sense if the single goal of the  UNHDI were just 
measuring basic human development and not, as in our case, assessing the evolution of well-being  
over time. 
24 
 The same reasoning is reproduced in Dasgupta and Weale (1992: 125) who, nonetheless, make an exception in the 
case of literacy: ‘It is not immediately apparent why it should be a lot less or a lot more difficult to increase the literacy 
rate when people are more literate’.  
25 
 The fact that the human development index aims at reflecting human needs does not necessarily imply that  
differences across countries should be forced to narrow down. On the contrary, the reader will notice the stress  HDR 
place on such differences in sharp contrast with the evidence provided by the  UNHDI . 
10 
Introducing the ‘Improved’ Index of Human Development  
As away to answering some of these queries I have constructed an  ‘i mproved’ human 
development index [ IHDI] in which its non-income dimensions are derived with a convex  
achievement function (that is, using expression [3]). Thus, in the alternative human development  
index, IHDI, as a social indicator reaches higher levels, its increases represent higher achievements 
than had the same increase taken place at a lower level, while in the  UNHDI they reflect the same  
change regardless its starting level.  
Some minor changes have been introduced in the conventional goalposts so the maximum  
and minimum represent levels above the highest and below the lowest,  respectively. 
26 
 For life 
expectancy at birth, while the conventional maximum,  M , of 85 years has been kept, a minimum,  
Mo , of 24 years has been chosen, while 25 years has been accepted as the lowest historical  leve l . 
27 
 
For the education indicators (literacy and enrolment), although  UNDP values of M=100 and Mo=0 
have been kept, the highest and lowest historical values have been set at 99 and  1 percent, 
respective ly.
28 
 
As regards per capita income, it is worth noting that, in international comparisons,  
dissatisfaction with nominal i ncome (that is, national GDP per head converted into a common  
currency using the trading exchange rate) has led to an almost generalized use of real income (the  
conversion per capita GDP into a common currency using a purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rate).
29 
 Unfortunately, the construction of PPP converters involves high costs in terms of  
26 
 Altering goalposts is not new. For example, Dasgupta (1990) and Kakwani (1993) used 80 years as the maximum  
goalpost for life expectancy at birth in present time developing countries.  
27 
 Truncating the lower part of the distribution by assuming a  ‘floor’ of 25 years of life expectancy, which is not far  
from the actual value in the poorest developing countries, both in the present and in the past, has the advantage of  
allowing one to consider countries for which no data exist. The alternative option would be to reduce the country  
sample. Moreover, accepting a minimum value,  Mo , of 24 years precludes a zero value for the transformed life 
expectancy. 
28 
 The assumption of 1 percent as the lowest historical value for literacy and enrolment seems more reasonable than 
accepting zero as in the UNHDI, while a historical maximum of 99 percent is also accepted in the  UNHDI . The 
consequence of assuming a historical lower bound of 1 percent is preventing zero values for the transformed  
variables. 
29 
 Empirical evidence strongly rejects the conventional results obtained through the trading exchange rate converter 
(Summers and Heston, 1991; Bart van Ark, 1993).  
11 
ti me and resources. Only PPPs for a restricted country sample have been constructed for earlier  
periods, and most of them for output  components. 
30  
An indirect method to derive historical estimates of real per capita income levels for a large  
sample of countries is the backward projection of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for a given  
benchmark with volume indices derived from national accounts  data. 
31 
 It is worth noting that 
fixed-base real (PPP-adjusted) product data represent a most convenient alternative to carrying  
out painstaking direct comparisons across space and time and have the presentation advantage  
that their growth rates are identical to those calculated from national accounts. 32 Alas, a distant  
PPP benchmark introduces distortions in inter-temporal comparisons since its validity depends on  
how stable the basket of goods and services used to construct the original PPP converters remains  
over time. As growth occurs overtime the composition of output, consumption and relative prices  
all vary, and the economic meaning of comparing real product per head based upon remote PPPs  
becomes entirely questionable. Hence, using a single PPP benchmark for long-run comparisons  
implies a hardly realistic assumption: that no changes in relative prices (and, hence, no  
technological change) takes place overtime. 
Unfortunately, in the current state of research there is no alternative to the use of this  
approach, especially when a world country sample over one and a half centuries is considered.  
Then, the UNHDI assumption that the marginal utility of per capita income declines as it  
reaches higher levels has been accepted. The reason to keep such an astringent assumption is  
that, following the UNDP proposal, this transformed measure is taken as a proxy for any well-
being dimension outside health and education, and not for income per head. Therefore, the log of  
GDP per head is employed in expression [1]) with a maximum of 1990 Geary-Khamis $ 40,000 and  
a minimum of 100 dollars. Similarly to the cases of social indicators, I have assumed a lower bound  
for per capita GDP, 300 Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars, which represents a basic level of physiological  
30  See the discussion in Prados de la Escosura (2000). Ward and Devereux (2003a, 2003b) have accepted the challenge  
to build direct PPP estimates from the expenditure side for twelve western economies at five benchmarks (1872,  
1884, 1905, 1930, and 1950).  
31  Maddison (2009) and Conference Board (2009) estimates era provide the best and most recent examples.  
32 
 A significant strand of the literature defends the view defends that the best estimates of growth rates are those  
obtained from national accounts (Bhagwati and Hansen 1973, Isenman 1980, Kravis and Lipsey 1991, Maddison 1991,  
1995) on the grounds that ‘using domestic prices to measure growth rates is more reliable, because those prices  
characterize the trade offs faced by the decision making  agents’ (Nuxoll 1994). 
12 
subsistence (Sagar and Najam 1998: 254, Milanovic et al. 2007), which is below the World Bank’s 
extreme poverty measure of one dollar a day/person and  Maddison’s (2006) 400 dollars per 
33  head .  
Finally, the three main dimensions of human development (longevity, knowledge, and  
income) have been combined using a geometric average to derive the new  IHDI . A geometric  
average of the human development attributes has the advantage of reducing their substitutability, 
precluding the chance that one  attribute’s i mprovement offsets another’s worsening, as it is the  
case with its arithmetic average employed in the UNHDI. Under the geometric average alternative,  
instead, only if all dimensions improve, will an improvement in the human development index 
take place. Thus, if we denote as L and E the non-linearly transformed values of life expectancy  
and education, and as Yun the adjusted per capita income, the ‘i mproved’ human development  
index can be expressed as, 
IHDI = L 
 1/3 
 E 
 1/3 
 Yun 
 1/3 [4] 
Trends in Human Development 
Trends in aggregate human development have been computed for four different country  
samples for which time and spatial coverage are inversely related. Thus while only 88 countries 
are considered for the entire time span, 1870-2005, its number rises to 99, 134, and 156 countries  
for those samples starting in 1913, 1950, and 1990, respectively. Fortunately these samples  
represent more than 90 percent of the world population (and practically all since 1950).  
Interestingly, the results for regional aggregates in each of these samples are highly coincidental  
so the different indices can be spliced into a single one for each main world  region. 
34 
 
A substantial improvement in world human development is observed since 1870  –and 
especially over 1913-1960-, multiplying by 7 its initial level. When the results for the IHDI and the 
UNHDI are compared, the same trend is confirmed, but for a significant difference in initial levels  
33 
 This lower bound for per capita income which, no doubt, truncates the data set at the bottom, allows me to  
consider countries in earlier periods for which no data exist and that, otherwise, would reduce the country sample  
considered here.  
34 
 Thus, I have spliced the four sample estimates into a single one in which the levels for each world region  i in the 
larger country sample  (Xi1990 )  are accepted while earlier benchmark estimates  (Xit,  for t = 1870, 1913, 1950) are  
successively re-scaled up to match the new benchmark level  X’ for the year (o) in which each pair of benchmark  
estimates overlap, X’it = (X’io/Xio )
*  Xit 
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and an absolute gap widening between them as the  IHDI lagged behind (Table 1 and Figure 1). In  
terms of the conventional HDR categories -‘low’ (<0.5), medium’ (0.5), and ‘high’ (0.8) levels-, the 
average human development in the world, according to the  IHDI, would still remain today in the  
‘l ow’ category, while, for the  UNHDI, the world belonged to the ‘medium’ level since 1960 and it is  
getting closer to the ‘high’ level. Thus, over 1870-2005 the gain in the UNHDI represented almost  
two-thirds of its potential maximum (that is, 1 less its initial level) while was only two-fifths for the  
IHDI. Nonetheless, the UNHDI improvement was more slowly, at 0.9 percent yearly, against 1.4  
percent for the IHDI . 
Trends in world human development are affected by its regional evolution, particularly, by  
that of large regions exhibiting idiosyncratic behaviour such as, for example, China and India or  
Africa. It can be noticed that their exclusion increases human development over 1870-2005 (Figure  
2 and Table 2). However, while including Africa worsens the world level since 1950 and, especially, 
since 1990; in the case of China and India, from 1980 onwards, their inclusion has a less negative  
impact on the world level as they (and especially China) have experienced substantial gains in  
human development.  
Regional disparities across the world seem, hence, relevant. Table 3 and Figure 3 compare  
levels and rates of change in the main regions. It appears that advanced countries, that is, Western  
Europe and its Offshoots (The US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) plus Japan –labelled here  
as OECD - crossed the 0.5 ‘medium level’threshold only in the 1950s, and are about to reach a  
‘high level’ of human development (0.8).
35 
 Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia) 
experienced an impressive catching-up to the  OECD between the 1920s and 1960, driven by Soviet  
Russia’s gains in human development, to stagnate and diverge thereafter. Latin America, in turn,  
caught up to the OECD until the 1970s, although more intensively during the first half of the  
twentieth century, and has only reached the ‘medium level’ lately. Asia, starting from low levels - 
similar to those of Africa up to the early 1920s-, improved significantly until 1970 and, again, at the  
35 
 OECD here refers to its pre-1995 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,  
Germany, Greece, Iceland – only since 1990-, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,  
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. No estimates have been obtained for Luxemburg. Turkey, although an OECD  
member, has been included in Asia in order to make a more homogeneous group in terms of development. New  
members since 1995: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, are included in Eastern Europe; South Korea, in Asia; and  
Mexico, in Latin America.  
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turn of the century. A sustained improvement took place in Africa between the 1920s and the 
1970s -with special intensity in the 1930s and 1950s- but has slowed down since 1980. Thus,  Asia’s 
catching up and Eastern Europe’s falling behind led these two regions to converge with Latin 
America, while Africa and the  OECD tend to diverge at low and high levels of human development.  
All this leads to the issue of whether the human development gap between the  ‘Core’–  
OECD- and the ‘Periphery’–all other countries, labelled the Rest henceforth- deepened over time.  
I have carried comparisons between OECD and the Rest in which China and India and Africa have  
been successively excluded (Table 4). It appears that the absolute gap  –that is, the difference in  
human development values- increased over time, although at a more intense pace until 1929  
(Figure 4). The inclusion of either China and India or Africa increased the gap but, since the 1980s,  
the human development improvement in these Asian countries made the gap between  OECD and 
the Rest, with and without China and India, to converge. The absolute gap between  ‘Core’ and 
‘Periphery’ results from differentials between OECD and each of the components of the Rest. A 
closer look at different developing regions reveals that most of the  OECD absolute gap with Latin  
America and Asia (excluding Japan) originated in the late nineteenth and the first half of the 
twentieth century, becoming relatively stable since the 1950s. This is not the case, however, for  
the absolute gap between OECD and Africa which increased steadily throughout the twentieth  
century, accelerating since 1980 (Figure 5). Central and Eastern Europe represents an outlier, with  
its gap to OECD closing between 1929 and 1960 to widen dramatically thereafter, converging 
towards the OECD-Latin America gap.  
However, in relative terms, the gap –namely, the ratio between OECD and the Rest- fell 
from 5.8 in 1900 to 2.4 in 1960 (and when China and India are excluded, from 4.1 in 1890 to 2.0 in  
1960) and stabilized for the last half a century (Figure 6). The relative gap between  OECD and each 
of the developing regions shrank over time, but while by mid-twentieth century the main  
reduction had already taken place in Latin America (from a ratio of 4.1 to 2 over 1880-1950, to 
represent 1.5 in 2005) and Asia (excluding Japan) (from 9.4 to 2.7 over 1913-1970, and was still 1.9  
by 2005) to stabilizing thereafter, the gap between OECD and Africa declined more gradually over  
1913-1980 (from 10.3 to 3.4, and remained at 3.2 in 2005). Meanwhile, the  OECD gap with Eastern 
Europe (including Russia), after falling to a minimum by 1960, provided the exception by  
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increasing to return to its pre-World War II size (Figure 7). It is worth noting that the declining  
relative gap in human development contrasts with the increasing gap in per capita income (Figure  
8). 
At this point it is worth focusing on how the absolute and relative differentials between  
OECD and the Rest resulting from the IHDI compare to those from the conventional  UNHDI . 
Although the absolute gap is initially larger in the case of the UNHDI, it exhibits an early declining  
trend (since the late 1920s), against a steady widening gap for the IHDI (Figure 9). When the  
relative differential is considered, it is appears that the  UNHDI gap is substantially lower and 
experienced a milder contraction over 1900-1960 (Figure 10). Thus, the  UNHDI offers a more 
benign view of the Core-Periphery differentials than the new human development index.  
And how does human development in today’s developing countries compare to that of  
advanced nations in the past? By 2005, the level of human development in the  Rest was similar to  
the OECD ’s in 1938, it had achieved the OECD level of 1913 by the mid-1980s, and only by the 
early 1950s matched the OECD level in 1870 (Table 4). A similar exercise for major world regions  
indicates that, in 2005, average human development levels in Central and Eastern Europe  
(including Russia), Latin America, Asia (excluding Japan), and Africa matched those of the  OECD in 
1965, 1955, 1938, and 1890, respectively. Alternatively, the  OECD level of human development in  
1913 was only reached by Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, Latin America in 1965,  
Asia in 1990, and has not been achieved in Africa yet (Table 3). 
36 
 
But, do regional differentials with the OECD in terms of human development match those 
in per capita GDP? In general, developing countries perform better in human development than in  
income per head terms -although not to the extent suggested by the conventional  UNHDI (Crafts 
2002). Thus, in 2005, real per capita GDP for the  Rest was similar to that of OECD by 1925, and  
only in 1970 did the Rest achieve the OECD income per head by 1870. Furthermore, in 2005, real 
per capita GDP in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were similar to that of  OECD by the early 1950s,  
1920, and mid-nineteenth century, respectively, while  OECD income per head in 1913 was not  
reached in Latin America until the late 1960s, up to 2000 in Asia, and has still to be achieved in  
36 
 Nonetheless, these results support the view that human development in  today’s less developed countries compare  
favourably with that of developed countries in the late nineteenth century (Crafts 2002).  
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Africa. This is the result of the public provision of health (Cutler and Miller 2005, Loudon 2000, 
McKeown et al. 1975, McKinley and McKinley 1977) and education that increased more than 
proportionally to income per head.  
Trends in human development result from those exhibited by each of its dimensions. For  
the world as a whole, education is the dimension which fits IHDI evolution more closely, while life  
expectancy and adjusted income, with lower and higher initial levels, experience faster and slower  
improvements, respectively. Human development dimensions, thus, converge, and more intensely  
before 1970 (Figure 11 and Table 5, Panel A).  
The multiplicative nature of the new human development index allow us to decompose 
changes in IHDI i nto those of its dimensions -that is, the transformed values of life expectancy and  
education, and adjusted per capita income. Thus, expression [4] can be differentiated, and  
changes in the IHDI expressed as the equally weighted average of the variation rates of its  
components. Thus, denoting rates of variation as low case,  
ihdi = 1/3 l + 1/3 e +1/3 yun [5] 
It can be observed that gains in the IHDI are driven by improvements in its social indicators  
(Table 5, Panel B, and Figure 12). Life expectancy is the main contributor to improving world  
human development over the long run, and specifically between 1880 and 1990. This fact is  
associated to the diffusion of new methods of preventing the disease transmission, including low 
cost improvements in public health and knowledge dissemination through schooling (Riley 2005b)  
and to the introduction of new vaccines (since the 1890s) and drugs to cure infectious diseases  
(sulfa drugs since the late 1930s and, since the 1950s, antibiotics) (Easterlin 1999: 270,  
Jayachandran et al. 2010). A closer look highlights the contribution of education prior to 1913 and, 
again, since 1990.  
When a similar exercise is carried out for the advanced and the developing countries and  
I HDI is decomposed into its dimensions (Figures 13-14), it emerges that, in the OECD, life 
expectancy made a significant contribution to the improvement of human development, especially 
during the first half of the twentieth century and since 1970 (Table 6 and Figure 15). Also  
education did it in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and, again, in the 1960s.  
Meanwhile, in the Rest, education improvement was significant in the late nineteenth century and  
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during the 1930s and, once more, since 1990; increasing longevity, however, only represented the  
main contribution to human development gains between 1913 and 1950 (even if it weakened  
during the Great Depression) (Table 7 and Figure 16). The stagnation of life expectancy in Eastern  
Europe, especially in Russia, since 1960 (and its decline in the 1990s), which converged to Asian  
levels, together with the remarkable slowdown since 1990 in Africa, as a result of HIV/AIDS, helps 
to explain it (Figure 17). Meanwhile, wide differences in education between Central and Eastern 
Europe and the developing world persisted over time (Figure 18).  
In our previous discussion it was found that the human development gap between  OECD 
and the Rest declined in absolute terms overthe long run, while the opposite occurred in relative  
terms, but what role did each of its different dimensions play in it? In absolute terms, up to 1929, 
the larger gap was in terms of education; then, life expectancy took over doubling its gap over  
1929-2005 (Figure 19). In relative terms, a dramatic contraction in the life expectancy gap took 
place between 1913 and 1970 - especially during the first half of the twentieth century-, which,  
then, stagnated and only increased slightly since 1990, as a result of the growing OECD differential  
with Russia and Africa. The relative gap in education fell throughout the twentieth century and at 
a remarkable pace over 1929-1960. In turn, the adjusted income gap, which arguably captures  
any other dimension of well-being, remained flat (Figure 20).  
If we now try to ascertain which share in the reduction of the relative gap in human  
development between the  OECD and the Rest is attributable to each of its dimensions, it appears  
that, during the phase of deeper decline, 1913-60, while life expectancy accounted for most of it  
over 1913-29 and 1938-50, education was the main responsible during the Depression years and  
in the 1950s. Since 1970, closing the gap slowed down, with education as the leading contributor  
(Figure 21). It can be suggested, therefore, that the human development gap between  OECD and 
the Rest has not closed as the catching up in life expectancy has stopped, largely due to the 
behaviour of Russia and Africa, while has weakened in terms of education.  
Concluding Remarks  
For many developing countries the usual pessimistic overtones of the  Human Development  
Reports are contradicted by the rosy picture that emerges from their figures when compared with 
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their own economic growth record. In an attempt to explain such a contradiction this paper offers  
a new, ‘i mproved’ human development index, in which social dimensions are obtained using a 
convex achievement function and the  index’s dimensions are combined multiplicatively.  
A long-run improvement in world human development is found for the last 135 years that,  
nonetheless, fell short of its maximum potential. Regional variance emerges an important feature  
of human development. In particular, while the absolute gap between rich and poor countries  
widened, the relative gap in human development, contrary to the observed trend in real income  
per head, fell over time. However, closing the gap has slowed down its pace significantly since  
1970 due to the behaviour of Africa and Central and Eastern Europe, especially Russia. Gains in life  
expectancy provide the main contribution to improving human development over the long run.  
However, the gap has failed to close largely as a result of the stagnation of life expectancy in  
Russia since 1960 and more recently as a consequence of the impact of HIV-AIDS in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
When compared to the conventional  UNDP index, the IHDI provides systematically lower  
levels of human development for the developing countries. As a result the gap between rich and  
poor countries is highlighted and a much less optimistic view than the conventional  UNHDI results, 
justifying the concern for international differences expressed in  Human Development Reports . 
These sobering new findings highlight the need to increase levels of human development in  
developing countries while suggests some weaknesses that required to be addressed, in particular,  
health improvements to enhance life expectancy and further stress on secondary and tertiary  
education.  
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Table 1 Human Development in the World, 1870-2005: Alternative Estimates  
Panel A Levels 
IHDI UNHDI 
Panel B Annual Growth Rates 
IHDI UNHDI 
1870 0.064 0.196 1870-1880 1.2 0.7 
1880 0.072 0.211 1880-1890 1.6 0.9 
1890 0.085 0.231 1890-1900 1.5 0.9 
1900 0.098 0.253 1900-1913 1.2 0.7 
1913 0.115 0.278 1913-1929 2.1 1.1 
1929 0.159 0.333 1929-1938 1.8 1.3 
1938 0.187 0.375 1938-1950 1.8 1.2 
1950 0.232 0.433 1950-1960 2.0 1.6 
1960 0.283 0.507 1960-1970 1.3 1.1 
1970 0.323 0.565 1970-1980 0.8 0.6 
1980 0.349 0.601 1980-1990 0.9 0.6 
1990 0.380 0.639 1990-2000 1.2 0.7 
2000 0.427 0.684 2000-2005 1.3 0.8 
2005 0.455 0.711 
1870-1913 1.4 0.8 
1913-1950 1.9 1.2 
1950-1970 1.7 1.3 
1970-1990 0.8 0.6 
1990-2005 1.2 0.7 
1870-2005 1.5 1.0 
Table 2 Human Development in the World, and excluding China and India, andAfrica, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
All 
excluding 
China and India 
excluding 
Africa  
Panel B Annual Growth Rates  
excluding 
All China and India 
excluding 
Africa  
1870 0.064 0.101 0.066 1870-1880 1.2 1.1 1.3 
1880 0.072 0.113 0.074 1880-1890 1.6 1.5 1.6 
1890 0.085 0.131 0.088 1890-1900 1.5 1.4 1.5 
1900 0.098 0.151 0.102 1900-1913 1.2 1.0 1.2 
1913 0.115 0.172 0.119 1913-1929 2.1 1.6 2.1 
1929 0.159 0.221 0.167 1929-1938 1.8 1.5 1.8 
1938 0.187 0.252 0.196 1938-1950 1.8 1.4 1.9 
1950 0.232 0.298 0.246 1950-1960 2.0 1.6 2.0 
1960 0.283 0.348 0.300 1960-1970 1.3 1.0 1.3 
1970 0.323 0.385 0.342 1970-1980 0.8 0.7 0.7 
1980 0.349 0.411 0.368 1980-1990 0.9 0.5 0.9 
1990 0.380 0.432 0.402 1990-2000 1.2 0.7 1.3 
2000 0.427 0.461 0.456 2000-2005 1.3 1.0 1.4 
2005 0.455 0.486 0.488 
1870-1913 1.4 1.2 1.4 
1913-1950 1.9 1.5 2.0 
1950-1970 1.7 1.3 1.6 
1970-1990 0.8 0.6 0.8 
1990-2005 1.2 0.8 1.3 
1870-2005 1.5 1.2 1.5 
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Table 3 Human Development across World Regions, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
World 
OECD 
Central & Eastern  
Europe (w/Russia)  
Latin America 
Asia 
(excluding Japan)  
Africa  
1870 0.064 0.180 0.074 0.044 0.024 0.020 
1880 0.072 0.200 0.085 0.049 0.026 0.021 
1890 0.085 0.235 0.099 0.061 0.028 0.022 
1900 0.098 0.269 0.122 0.076 0.029 0.026 
1913 0.115 0.305 0.141 0.106 0.032 0.030 
1929 0.159 0.379 0.209 0.141 0.067 0.043 
1938 0.187 0.414 0.280 0.163 0.087 0.058 
1950 0.232 0.468 0.399 0.234 0.118 0.074 
1960 0.283 0.531 0.495 0.281 0.170 0.116 
1970 0.323 0.591 0.527 0.328 0.221 0.147 
1980 0.349 0.636 0.541 0.383 0.253 0.185 
1990 0.380 0.684 0.542 0.414 0.302 0.209 
2000 0.427 0.746 0.536 0.485 0.369 0.228 
2005 0.455 0.779 0.557 0.510 0.406 0.245 
Panel B Average Growth Rates (%) 
OECD 
World  
Central & Eastern  
Europe (w/Russia)  
Latin America  
Asia 
(excluding Japan)  
Africa  
1870-1880 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.5 
1880-1890 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.2 0.8 0.6 
1890-1900 1.5 1.3 2.1 2.2 0.3 1.6 
1900-1913 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.6 0.8 0.9 
1913-1929 2.1 1.4 2.5 1.8 4.5 2.3 
1929-1938 1.8 1.0 3.3 1.6 2.9 3.4 
1938-1950 1.8 1.0 2.9 3.0 2.6 2.0 
1950-1960 2.0 1.3 2.1 1.8 3.6 4.6 
1960-1970 1.3 1.1 0.6 1.6 2.6 2.4 
1970-1980 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.5 1.3 2.3 
1980-1990 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.8 1.8 1.2 
1990-2000 1.2 0.9 -0.1 1.6 2.0 0.9 
2000-2005 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.9 1.4 
1870-1913 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 0.7 0.9 
1913-1950 1.9 1.2 2.8 2.1 3.5 2.5 
1950-1970 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.7 3.1 3.5 
1970-1990 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.2 1.6 1.8 
1990-2005 1.2 0.9 0.2 1.4 2.0 1.1 
1870-2005 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.9 
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Table 4 Human Development in OECD and the Rest, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
OECD The Rest 
The Rest without  
China & India 
Panel B 
Africa 
Annual Growth Rates  
OECD The Rest 
The Rest without 
China & India Africa 
1870 0.180 0.032 0.043 0.032 1870-1880 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 
1880 0.200 0.036 0.049 0.036 1880-1890 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.3 
1890 0.235 0.041 0.057 0.041 1890-1900 1.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 
1900 0.269 0.046 0.069 0.048 1900-1913 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.4 
1913 0.305 0.055 0.083 0.057 1913-1929 1.4 3.2 2.4 3.3 
1929 0.379 0.093 0.122 0.097 1929-1938 1.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 
1938 0.414 0.121 0.158 0.127 1938-1950 1.0 2.5 2.2 2.6 
1950 0.468 0.163 0.206 0.174 1950-1960 1.3 2.9 2.3 2.9 
1960 0.531 0.217 0.259 0.231 1960-1970 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.8 
1970 0.591 0.261 0.297 0.276 1970-1980 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 
1980 0.636 0.290 0.328 0.305 1980-1990 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.2 
1990 0.684 0.326 0.352 0.344 1990-2000 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.5 
2000 0.746 0.374 0.380 0.400 2000-2005 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.6 
2005 0.779 0.404 0.405 0.434 
1870-1913 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.3 
1913-1950 1.2 2.9 2.4 3.0 
1950-1970 1.2 2.3 1.8 2.3 
1970-1990 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.1 
1990-2005 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.5 
1870-2005 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 
Table 5 Human Development and Its Dimensions: The World, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
IHDI Life Expectancy  Education Adjusted Income  
Panel B Annual IHDI Growth and its Decomposition (%)  
IHDI Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
1870 0.064 0.021 0.061 0.332 1870-1880 1.2 0.32 0.58 0.10 
1880 0.072 0.023 0.074 0.344 1880-1890 1.6 0.49 0.42 0.09 
1890 0.085 0.029 0.090 0.358 1890-1900 1.5 0.50 0.39 0.11 
1900 0.098 0.036 0.106 0.375 1900-1913 1.2 0.47 0.38 0.14 
1913 0.115 0.044 0.125 0.399 1913-1929 2.1 0.67 0.28 0.05 
1929 0.159 0.077 0.159 0.418 1929-1938 1.8 0.48 0.47 0.05 
1938 0.187 0.096 0.197 0.427 1938-1950 1.8 0.79 0.28 -0.07 
1950 0.232 0.152 0.232 0.411 1950-1960 2.0 0.41 0.40 0.19 
1960 0.283 0.191 0.290 0.457 1960-1970 1.3 0.53 0.28 0.19 
1970 0.323 0.235 0.324 0.494 1970-1980 0.8 0.54 0.18 0.28 
1980 0.349 0.264 0.337 0.524 1980-1990 0.9 0.46 0.27 0.27 
1990 0.380 0.294 0.358 0.557 1990-2000 1.2 0.35 0.48 0.17 
2000 0.427 0.331 0.421 0.589 2000-2005 1.3 0.33 0.34 0.32 
2005 0.455 0.352 0.449 0.625 
1870-1913 1.4 0.45 0.44 0.11 
1913-1950 1.9 0.66 0.33 0.02 
1950-1970 1.7 0.46 0.35 0.19 
1970-1990 0.8 0.50 0.23 0.27 
1990-2005 1.2 0.35 0.43 0.22 
1870-2005 1.5 0.52 0.37 0.12 
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Table 6 Human Development and Its Dimensions: OECD, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
IHDI Life Expectancy  Education Adjusted Income 
Panel B Annual IHDI Growth and its Decomposition  
IHDI Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
1870 0.180 0.068 0.202 0.476 1870-1880 1.1 0.25 0.57 0.19 
1880 0.200 0.073 0.240 0.503 1880-1890 1.6 0.52 0.39 0.09 
1890 0.235 0.093 0.288 0.526 1890-1900 1.3 0.48 0.39 0.13 
1900 0.269 0.111 0.333 0.553 1900-1913 1.0 0.46 0.38 0.16 
1913 0.305 0.132 0.383 0.587 1913-1929 1.4 0.55 0.36 0.09 
1929 0.379 0.188 0.481 0.623 1929-1938 1.0 0.57 0.40 0.03 
1938 0.414 0.218 0.535 0.629 1938-1950 1.0 0.77 0.16 0.06 
1950 0.468 0.288 0.566 0.643 1950-1960 1.3 0.43 0.30 0.27 
1960 0.531 0.338 0.632 0.712 1960-1970 1.1 0.30 0.38 0.32 
1970 0.591 0.371 0.713 0.787 1970-1980 0.7 0.61 0.14 0.24 
1980 0.636 0.424 0.736 0.831 1980-1990 0.7 0.57 0.22 0.21 
1990 0.684 0.480 0.771 0.870 1990-2000 0.9 0.61 0.25 0.14 
2000 0.746 0.562 0.824 0.903 2000-2005 0.9 0.64 0.26 0.10 
2005 0.779 0.611 0.852 0.914 
1870-1913 1.2 0.44 0.42 0.14 
1913-1950 1.2 0.62 0.31 0.07 
1950-1970 1.2 0.37 0.34 0.30 
1970-1990 0.7 0.59 0.18 0.23 
1990-2005 0.9 0.62 0.26 0.13 
1870-2005 1.1 0.51 0.34 0.15 
Table 7 Human Development and Its Dimensions: the Rest, 1870-2005  
Panel A Levels 
IHDI Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
Panel B Annual IHDI Growth and its Decomposition  
IHDI Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
1870 0.032 0.007 0.024 0.296 1870-1880 1.1 0.48 0.45 0.07 
1880 0.036 0.008 0.027 0.301 1880-1890 1.3 0.47 0.41 0.12 
1890 0.041 0.010 0.030 0.312 1890-1900 1.4 0.57 0.34 0.09 
1900 0.046 0.013 0.035 0.324 1900-1913 1.3 0.51 0.37 0.12 
1913 0.055 0.016 0.042 0.343 1913-1929 3.2 0.61 0.36 0.03 
1929 0.093 0.044 0.076 0.358 1929-1938 3.0 0.50 0.44 0.06 
1938 0.121 0.061 0.101 0.371 1938-1950 2.5 0.68 0.41 -0.08 
1950 0.163 0.112 0.146 0.343 1950-1960 2.9 0.42 0.40 0.18 
1960 0.217 0.152 0.196 0.390 1960-1970 1.8 0.49 0.36 0.15 
1970 0.261 0.204 0.242 0.425 1970-1980 1.1 0.40 0.35 0.25 
1980 0.290 0.231 0.271 0.461 1980-1990 1.2 0.37 0.37 0.26 
1990 0.326 0.261 0.304 0.501 1990-2000 1.4 0.37 0.41 0.22 
2000 0.374 0.293 0.347 0.538 2000-2005 1.5 0.29 0.35 0.37 
2005 0.404 0.311 0.373 0.580 
1870-1913 1.3 0.51 0.38 0.10 
1913-1950 2.9 0.61 0.39 0.00 
1950-1970 2.3 0.45 0.38 0.16 
1970-1990 1.1 0.38 0.36 0.26 
1990-2005 1.4 0.34 0.39 0.28 
1870-2005 1.9 0.52 0.38 0.09 
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Figure 1 Human Development in the World, 1870-2005: UNHDI and IHDI Estimates  
Figure 2 Human Development in the World, and excluding China and India and Africa, 1870-2005  
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Figure 3 Human Development across World Regions, 1870-2005 
Figure 4 Absolute Gap in Human Development between OECD and the Rest, 1870-2005  
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Figure 5 Absolute Gap in Human Development between OECD and Developing Regions  
Figure 6 Relative Gap in Human Development between OECD and the Rest, 1870-2005  
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Figure 7 Relative Gap in Human Development between OECD and Developing Regions  
Figure 8 Relative Gap in Real Per Capita GDP between OECD and the Rest, 1870-2005  
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Figure 9 Absolute Human Development Gap between OECD and the Rest: UNHDI and IHDI  
Figure 10 Relative Human Development Gap between OECD and the Rest: UNHDI and IHDI  
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Figure 11 Dimensions of Human Development in the World, 1870-2005  
Figure 12 Decomposing IHDI Average Yearly Variation into Its Dimensions in the World  
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Figure 13 Dimensions of Human Development in the OECD, 1870-2005 
Figure 14 Dimensions of Human Development in the Rest, 1870-2005  
45 
3.20 
2.70 
2.20 
1.70 
1.20 
-0.30 
0.70 
0.20 
18
70
-1
88
0 
18
80
-1
89
0 
Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
18
30
-1
90
0 
19
00
-1
91
3 
19
13
-1
92
9 
19
29
-1
93
8 
19
31
3-
19
50
 
19
50
-1
96
0 
19
60
-1
97
0 
19
70
-1
98
0 
19
80
-1
99
0 
19
90
-2
00
0 
20
00
-2
00
5 
1.60 
1.40 
1.20 
1.00 
0.80  
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
0.00 
18
70
-1
88
0 
18
80
-1
89
0 
Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income  
18
90
-1
90
0 
19
00
-1
91
3 
19
13
-1
92
9 
19
29
-1
93
8 
19
38
-1
95
0 
19
50
-1
96
0 
19
60
-1
97
0 
19
70
-1
98
0 
19
80
-1
99
0 
19
90
-2
00
0 
20
00
-2
00
5 
Figure 15 Decomposing IHDI Average Yearly Variation into its Dimensions in OECD  
Figure 16 Decomposing IHDI Average Yearly Variation into its Dimensions in the Rest  
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Figure 17 Life Expectancy in the Rest: Regional Composition  
Figure 18 Education in the Rest: Regional Composition  
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Figure 19 Human Development Dimensions: Absolute Gap between OECD and the Rest  
Figure 20 Human Development Dimensions: Relative Gap between OECD and the Rest  
48 
0.50 
-0.50 
0.00 
-1.00 
-1.50 
-2.00 
18
70
-1
88
0 
18
80
-1
89
0 
Life Expectancy Education Adjusted Income 
18
90
-1
90
0 
19
00
-1
91
3 
19
13
-1
92
9 
19
29
-1
93
8 
19
38
-1
95
0 
19
50
-1
96
0 
19
60
-1
97
0 
19
70
-1
98
0 
19
80
-1
99
0 
19
90
-2
00
0 
20
00
-2
00
5 
Figure 21 Decomposing Average Yearly Variation in the Relative OECD-Rest IHDI Gap into Its  
Dimensions 
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Data Appendix  
Life Expectancy at birth  
Life expectancy is defined in the  ‘Technical Notes’  to the United Nations (2000),  
Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement 1948-1997 
 as “the average number of years of life  
which would remain for males and females reaching the ages specified if they continued to be  
subjected to the same mortality experienced in the year(s) to which these life expectancies  refer”. In 
the Life Tables, estimates are based on the assumption that  “the theoretical cohort is subject,  
throughout its existence, to the age-specific mortality rates observed at a particular time. Thus levels  
of mortality prevailing at the time a life table is constructed are assumed to remain unchanged into  
the future until all members of the cohort have  died” 
Unless reference is made to a specific  country’s sources, UNDP Human Development  
Report (2009) provides the data for most countries over 1980-2005. The United Nations (2000),  
Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement  provide the data from 1950 onwards. Pre- 1950  data 
comes from Flora (1983), vol. II, for Western Europe while for Latin America from Astorga  et al. 
(2003) OxLAD database (which Pablo Astorga kindly supplemented with the working sheets  
prepared by Shane and Barbara Hunt), completed for the nineteenth century with Arriaga (1968).  
Riley’s ‘Bibliography’ has proved to be extremely useful both for the references it provides as for  
the data included in it.  
Exceptionally, in the absence of life expectancy estimates for early years, its level has been  
obtained by projecting available data with infant survival rates. This is the procedure was used to  
distribute the average life expectancy estimate for Argentina, 1869-94; and to derive life expectancy  
for Jamaica, 1880-1900; Panama, 1900-29; Guyana, 1950-60; and Yugoslavia, 1929-50.  
Africa  
Most pre-1 950 estimates come from Riley (2005b) who points out that the earliest health  
transition started in the 1920s when mean and median values were 26.4 and 25.4 years,  
respectively. Strong assumptions were needed. Lower bound estimates for 1950 or 1940s levels  
were used for 1938, while prior to 1929 life expectancy at birth was assumed to be 25 years (the  
minimum goalpost) for Sub Saharan Africa unless specified below.  
Algeria, 1930s, Riley (2005b); 1920s, assumed to be the same as  Tunisia’s.  
Angola, 1938, Riley (2005b). 
Benin, 1938, Riley (2005b).  
Cameroon, 1929 and  193 3, and 193 8 (assumed to be equal to the lower bound estimate for 1950),  
Riley (2005b).  
Angola, Benin, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Niger, Sudan, Togo, 1929-33, assumed to  
be as Nigeria’s.  
Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep.,  Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,  
Rwanda, Tanzania, 1929-33, assumed to be as in Ghana.  
Côte d’Ivoire, 1938, Riley (2005b).  
Egypt, 1929-38, Fargues (1986); 1925, assumed to be similar to  Tunisia’s. 
Ethiopia, 193 8, Riley (2005b).  
Ghana, 1920, Riley (2005b), 1933, Bourguignon and Morrison (2002)  
Kenya, Riley (2005b) provides an estimate of 23.5 years for the 1930s. Thus, the minimum goalpost  
of 25 years was assigned to the pre-1938 period.  
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Malawi, 1925-33, assumed to be as in Mauritius.  
Mauritius, 1920s, Riley (2205b); 1930s, assumed to be the same as in 1942-6, UN (1993)  
Morocco, 1925-38, assumed to be as  Tunisia’s 
Mozambique, 1929 -3 8, assumed to be as in Angola’s.  
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Namibia, 1870-1900, assumed it evolves as South Africa; 1900, assumed to be the same as for  
blacks in Cape Colony from Simkins et al. (1989); 1938, Notkola et al. (2000) 161, Northern  
Namibia figure adjusted with the ratio all Namibia to Northern Namibia c. 1960. It does not change  
over 1900-38.  
Nigeria, 1929-3 3, average of Ayeni (1976) for  193 1, cited in Riley (2005b).  
Senegal, 1938, average of Riley (2005b).  
South Africa, 1880-1925, Simkins et al. (1989); 1929-38, van Tonder andvan Eeden (1975), cited  
in Riley (2005b). 
Tunisia, 1920s, Riley (2005b); 1930s, assumed to be the same as in  Algeria’s. 
Uganda, 1930s (c 1935), 23.9 (Riley 2005b), so I have assigned the minimum goalpost for 1850- 
1938. 
Zambia, 1929 -3 8, assumed to be the same as  Zimbabwe’s.  
Zimbabwe, 1930s, 26.4 Riley (2005b). I have assigned the  minimum goalpost over 1850-1929.  
The Americas  
Argentina, 1870-90, Recchini de Lattes and Lattes (1975).  
Canada, United Nations (2000) level for 1938 backwards projected for  pre-1 938 period with  
Bourbeau et al. (1997) in order to maintain consistence over time.  
Chile, 1890-1900, and Uruguay, 1870-1900, assumed to have evolved along Argentina.  
Uruguay, 1900-193 8, Ministerio de Salud Pública (200 1), 
Life expectancy in Columbia, 1870-1900, and Cuba, 1860-1900, Panama, 1880-1900, Honduras,  
1890-1900, Puerto Rico, 1860-90, and Venezuela, 1880-1900, has been assumed to evolve along  
Costa Rica’s. 
Paraguay, 1900, Arriaga (1968).  
Peru, 1913 -3 8, has been assumed to evolve along  Bolivia’s and Puerto Rico, 1900-50 along  Cuba’s. 
Puerto Rico, 1860-90, assumed it evolves along Costa Rica; 1890, Riley (2005b); 1900-38, UN DY  
1993. 
Trinidad-Tobago, 1860-1900, assumed to have evolved along  Jamaica’s.  
U.S.A., up to 1890, Haines (1994).  
Uruguay, 1913 -3 8, Ministerio de Salud Pública  (200 1) 
Asia 
Most pre-1 950estimates  come from Riley (2005b) who claims that the earliest health  
transition started in the 1870/90s when mean and median values were 27.5 and 25.1 years,  
respectively. Strong assumptions were have been accepted. Lower bound estimates for 1950 or  
1940s levels were used for 1938, while prior to 1929 life expectancy at birth was assumed to be 25  
years (the minimum goalpost) unless specified below.  
Cambodia, 1938, Siampos (1970), cited in Riley (2005b); 1929-33, assumed it evolved along China  
as they had similar levels in 1925 and 1938.  
China, 193 8 and 1925, upper and lower bound in  1925-3 6, respectively, Riley (2005b);  1929 -3 3, 
Caldwell et al. (1986), cited in Lavely and Wong (1998).  
Hong Kong SAR, assumed to have evolved at the same rate of variation as  Taiwan’s, 1900-1938 
Cyprus, up to 1933, since in Cyprus and Greece life expectancy levels were identical in 1890 and  
very close in 1938, I assumed they were the same over the period. Figures for 1890, from Riley  
(2005b)  
India, 1890-1938, McAlpin (1983); extrapolated to 1880 with Visaria and Visaria (1982).  
Indonesia, 1920s, Riley (2005b).  
Japan, 1870, Riley (2005b); 1880, Janetta and Preston (1991); 1890-1900, Johansson and Mosk  
(1987). 
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Korea, 1913, Riley (2005b) for 1915, 23.5 years. Since I assumed the historical lower bound to be  
25 years, this value was assigned to the pre-1913 era; 1920s-1933, adding 0.87 years per  annum as 
suggested by Riley (2005b);  193 8, UN DY 1993.  
Lao PDR, 1929-33, assumed to evolve as  Vietnam’s.  
Malaysia, 1929-38, 1950 level backwards projected with the infant survival rate.  
Nepal, 1925 -3 3, assumed to evolve as India.  
Singapore, 1929-38, 1950 level backwards projected with the infant survival rate; 1870-1925,  
assumed to evolve at the same pace as  Malaysia’s. 
Sri Lanka, 1890-1925,  193 8, Langford and Storey (1993); 1929, Sarkar (1951),  1929-3 3.  
Taiwan, 1890-1938,1955, Cha and Wu (2002); 1950, Glass and Grebenik (1967); 1980-2005,  
english.moe.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9101916565871.pdf;  2000-5, Tsai (2008).  
Thailand, 193 8, Vallin (1976).  
Turkey, pre- 1913, 1920s and 1930s, assumed it evolved at the same rate of change as  Greece’s;  
1913, Pamuk (2007);  193 8, Shorter and Macura (1982).  
Oceania  
Australia, 1870-1900, Whitwell et al. (1997).  
New Zealand (adjusted for Maori population), 1870, Riley (2005b); 1880-90, Glass and Grebenik  
(1967). 
Europe  
Austria, 1870, Helczmanovski (1979); 1880-1890, interpolated from Helczmanovski (1979), Glass  
and Grebenik (1967: 82), and the UN (1993).  
Belgium, Deprez (1979), 1870, and Flora (1983), 1880-1900. Interpolation with UN (1993) for  
1928/32.  
Bulgaria, 1870-90, assumed to move along  Greece’s.  
Cyprus, Since in Cyprus and Greece the levels in 1890 were identical and in 1950 very close, I  
assumed they were the same over the period up to 1938.  
Czechoslovakia, 1870-1913, Sbr (1962), For 1890, Riley (2005b).  
Finland, up to 1990, Kannisto et al. (1999).  
France, 1870-1900, Flora (1983).  
Germany, 1870-90, Flora (1983).  
Greece, pre-1913, Valaoras (1960).  
Hungary, 1870-1900, assumed to evolve along  Austria’s.  
Ireland, 1850-1900, assumed to evolve along the  U.K.’s  
Italy, 1881, and 1901, Zamagni (1990); 1870- 1938, Conte et al. (2007).  
Poland, 1870-1913, assuming it evolved as  Czechoslovakia’s.  
Portugal, 1850-1933, Leite (2005); 1920-30, Veiga (2005); 1925-9,  Valèrio (2001). 
Romania, assumed to evolve along Greece, 1870-90, and along  Bulgaria’s, 1890-1929. 
Russia, Pressat (1985), European Russia, 1870-1913; European Soviet Union, 1925-33; Soviet  
Union, 1938.  
Baltic Republics, Ukraine, 1900,  193 5, Riley (2005b), Mazur (1969).  
Spain, Dopico and Reher (1998),1870-1938; 1950-2000, Nicolau (2005) and Goerlich and Pinilla  
(2005). 
Sweden, 1870-1965, Sandberg and Steckel (1997), taken from Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968).  
UK, 1850-1900, Floud and Harris (1997).  
Yugoslavia, assumed to evolve along  Greece’s, 1870-90, and along Bulgaria’s, 1890-1929.  
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Literacy  
The rate of adult literacy is defined as the percentage of population aged 15 years or over  
who is able to read and write. While from a conceptual point of view there are no objections to the  
UNESCO definition of literate person, namely,  ‘who can, with understanding, both read and write a  
short simple statement on his everyday  life’ (quoted in Nilsson 1999: 278), assessing a  person’s  
literacy is quite a different issue. Empirically, literacy is a far from uniform a concept. On the one  
hand, reading and writing do not necessarily go together in developing countries and it has been  
shown that, prior to the diffusion of the schooling system, the lag between acquiring the ability to  
read and to write can be as wide as a century or more  (Markussen 1990, Nilsson 1999) and,  
therefore, the estimated literacy rate would vary wildly depending on whether a wide (read ability  
only) or a narrow (reading and writing skills) definition of literacy is used, and how it is actually  
measured (with marriage signatures being particularly misleading in pre-industrial societies).  
Moreover, becoming literate is far more difficult and time-intensive in countries which languages  
employ Chinese characters (Taira 1971, Honda 1997). In practice, although classifying a personas  
truly literate should imply that she is able to read and write, it not always possible make such a  
precise distinction for the past (Nilsson 1999: 279). This has led to historians to focus on estimating  
the share of illiterate population (Flora 1973). Unfortunately, historical data are far from  
homogeneous and, therefore, the results will suffer from biases which, nonetheless, will not  
condition long run trends.  
The UNDP Human Development Report  (2009) provides most of the data for 1980-2005.  
Unless reference is made to a specific  country’s sources, data from 1950 onwards come from the  
UNESCO (1953, 1957, 1970, 2002) and World Bank (2008), completed with data from Banks  
(2010), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and Easterly (1999), while. Additional data for 1850-1965  
comes from Flora (1973). As regards different world regions, Flora (1983) provides data for  
Western Europe, while for Latin America in the twentieth century comes from Astorga and  
Fitzgerald (199 8) and Astorga et al. (2003) OxLAD database (which Pablo Astorga kindly  
supplemented with their working sheets prepared by Shane and Barbara Hunt), completed with  
Newland (199 1) for the nineteenth century.  
Exceptionally, in the absence of estimates, literacy rates have been backwards projected with  
the rate of primary enrolment or the years of primary education  (Morrisson and Murtin (2009).  
Also, for the post-1960, in its absence, it has been derived by assuming the illiteracy rate to be  
identical to the share of population without any schooling from data in Barro and Lee (2002) and  
Cohen and Soto (2007).  
Africa  
There is uncertainty about literacy rates even in recent times as evidenced by the wide  
discrepancies between UNESCO and UNDP figures  for16 countries out of 53 over the years 1980- 
95. In order to keep consistency with  UNDP’s HDR I have opted for the latter with a few  
exceptions (Algeria 1990-95, Botswana 1980-85).  
Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, 1970-80, Ouane and Amon-Tanoh  
(1990). 
Literacy rates have been projected backwards with the rate of primary enrolment for Algeria,  1870 - 
80,1930s; Burundi, 1929; Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Zambia, 1929-38; Ghana 1880- 
193 8; Kenya, Sudan and  Tanzania, 1920-3 8;  Lesotho and Liberia,  1890-193 8; Mauritius, 1870- 
193 3; Namibia, Nigeria, Togo, and Zimbabwe, 1913 -3 8; Seychelles and Sierra Leone,  1900-3 8;  
South Africa, 1925-33; Uganda, 1920-38.  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the population  
above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Angola, Cameroon,  Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar,  
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal  1870-193 8; Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1870-193 3; Kenya and  
Uganda, 1870-1913; Sierra Leone and Tunisia, 1870-90.  
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Namibia, 1870-1913, assumed to evolve along South Africa; Botswana and Swaziland, 1870-1938,  
assumed to be the same as Namibia’s. Libya, 1870 -1900, assumed to be as  Morocco’s.  
The Americas  
Chile, 1870, Braun et al. (2000).  
Cuba, 1870-90, Newland  (199 1).  
Nicaragua, 1900, Núñez (2005) 
U.S., 1870-90, 1960-70, Costa and Steckel (1997)  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with the rate of primary enrolment for Bahamas,  
1890-1900; Barbados, 1870-1938; Belize, 1870-1900; Bolivia, 1870-1890; Guyana, 1870-1900;  
Puerto Rico, 1870-1890.  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the population  
above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Dominican Republic, 1870-1900; El Salvador,  
1870-1890; Uruguay, 1870-1890, and Venezuela, 1870-80.  
Trinidad-Tobago, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Surinam, assumed to  
evolve along Jamaica over 1870-90.  
Asia  
China, 1870, 1913, Morrisson and Murtin (2007).  
India, 1890, 193 8, Tomlinson (1993).  
Japan, 1870, Steckel and Floud (1997); 1880-90, (assuming the rate of primary enrolment was a  
good approximation), Hanley (1990); 1900-3 8, Honda (1997).  
Korea, 1929-33, Kimura (1990).  
Australia, 1870, Vamplew (1987); 1890-1900, Steckel and Foud (1997).  
Literacy rates have been projected backwards with the rate of primary enrolment for Cambodia and  
Laos, 1913-38; China, 1929-33; Hong Kong, 1870-1925; India, 1870-80, 1920s; Indonesia, Taiwan,  
and Vietnam, 1900 -3 8; Iran, Jordan, Malaysia and Myammar, 1920s; Israel, Lebanon, Sri Lanka,  
and Syria, 1920-38; Korea, 1913-25; Fiji, 1900-13, 1925-38.  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the population  
above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Iraq, 1870-1938; Malaysia, 1870-1900;  
Myammar, 1870-80; Philippines, 1870-1913; Syria, 1870-1900; Thailand, 1880-1920,1929.  
Europe  
Austria, 1880-1913, Flora (1983).  
Belgium, 1938,1955, Banks (2010)  
Bulgaria, 1955, 1965, Banks (2010)  
Czechoslovakia, 1880-1900, Flora (1983); 1938, 1955, 1965, Banks (2010)  
Finland, 1870, Crafts (1997); 1880-90, Myllantaus (1990); 1900, Flora (1983); 1925-60, Banks  
(2010). 
Germany, 1950, 1955, Banks (2010)  
Greece, 1925-55, Banks (2010)  
Ireland, 1870-1900, Flora (1983); 1913, Crafts (1997).  
Italy, 1870-80, Flora (1983); 1890, 1960, Conte et al. (2007); 1925, 1938, 1955, Banks (2010)  
Poland, 1870-90, assumed to evolve along  Hungary’s; 1900, Flora (1983); 1920-65, Banks (2010).  
Portugal, 1880, Reis (1993); 1880-90, 1913-38, 1955-65, Nunes (1993).  
Romania, 1920-65, Banks (2010)  
Russia, 1870-1960, Mironov (1991, 1993).  
Spain, 1870-80, Núñez (2005); 1890-1930, Reher (personal communication);  Viñao (1990). 
Sweden, 1870-1965, Banks (2010).  
Yugoslavia//Serbia, 1920-90, Banks (2010)  
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U.K., 1870-1965, Banks (2010).  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with the rate of primary enrolment for Albania, 1920- 
38; Cyprus, 1880-1900; Estonia, 1938-65; Luxembourg, 1929-38; Malta, 1890-1900;  
Literacy rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education (Morrisson and  
Murtin (2009) for Bulgaria, 1870-80.  
Enrolment  
The enrolment ratio is computed by referring the number of students, at a particular  
education level, to the relevant school age population. Historical evidence allows one to estimate  
the rate of unadjusted enrolment defined as the percentage of population aged 5-24 enrolled in  
primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Enrolment rates basically capture the expansion of  
formal education and do not inform about the length of the academic year,  students’ attendance, the  
content and quality of education, or  students’ performance and completion (See Benavot and Riddle  
1988 for a detailed discussion of its shortcomings and biases). Figures on enrolment, apparently  
straight forward, present difficulties of interpretation. The usual measurement procedure is to divide  
the number of students by the relevant school-age population cohort, for example, primary  
enrolment rate as the share of children receiving primary education over population aged 5 to 14  
years, keeping this yardstick fixed over time (namely, the  unadjusted enrolment rate). Usually,  
however, such age span is longer that primary schooling, leading to an underestimate and, even  
worse, comparability is fraught with difficulties as the length of primary or secondary schooling  
changes across countries and over time and, therefore, biases of unknown sign are introduced  
(Benavot and Riddle 1988: 195; Nilsson 1999: 282). Alas, up to the mid-twentieth century, the only  
kind of enrolment rate that can be easily computed for a large number of countries and over a long  
time span is the unadjusted one. Later, international organizations (UNESCO, OECD, World Bank)  
have provided gross enrolment rates, in which the denominator is adjusted to the age bracket for  
which each type of schooling (primary, secondary, etc) is provided. Here the difficulty is that  
enrolment rates above 100 percent can appear as under- and/or over-age students are included in the  
numerator. Eliminating them is, thus, required, and the result is the unusually available net  
enrolment rate. In the present case, since the numerator includes primary, secondary, and tertiary  
enrolment numbers and the denominator, population aged 5-24, the differences between gross and  
net rates tend to be negligible. However, the unadjusted rate will usually underestimate the actual  
enrolment rate as in the past hardly any  country’s education extended to those age 24 years. Thus, I  
have corrected the bias in my historical estimates (here, pre-1980) with the ratio for 1980 between  
gross all enrolment rates and the unadjusted rates I computed from historical sources.  
The UNDP Human Development Report  (2009) provides most of the data from 1980  
onwards. Unless reference is made to a specific  country’s sources, enrolment estimates come from  
Banks (2010) and Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) completed with UNESCO (2010) for the period  
1970-2005, while. Additional data for Western Europe comes from Flora  (19 83), while for Latin  
America most estimates come from  Astorga and Fitzgerald  (199 8) and Astorga et al. (2003) 
OxLAD database (which Pablo  Astorga kindly supplemented with their working sheets prepared by  
Shane and Barbara Hunt), completed with Newland  (199 1) for the nineteenth century  
As regards the relevant population, I have computed the share of population aged 5-24 (and  
5-14) over total population at census years from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and interpolated  
them log-linearly to derive yearly series that have been, then, multiplied by total population figures,  
provided by Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c), and supplemented with those by Banks (2010) and  
Maddison (2009). The population share of those aged 5-24 years for missing African and Asian  
countries have been replaced with the one from a neighbour country with a similar demographic  
transition.  
55 
For the pre-World War II era, Benavot and Riddle  (199 8) and Lindert (2004) provide useful  
estimates of primary and primary and secondary education enrolment rates, respectively, that in the  
absence of direct sources, have been used.  
Occasionally, the all (that is, primary, secondary, and tertiary) enrolment rate for nineteenth  
and early twentieth century Asian and African countries has been obtained by adjusting the primary  
or primary and secondary enrolment ratio with the ratio resulting of dividing the share of population  
aged 5 -14 years by the share of population aged  5 -24. This crude procedure implies the assumption  
that secondary and tertiary enrolment numbers represent a tiny proportion of the relevant population  
cohort.  
Africa  
Algeria, 1870-1960, Fargues (1986).  
Tunisia, 1925-38, 1960, Fargues (1986).  
Population aged 5-24 (and 5-14) share in total population for missing countries.  Nigeria’s has also  
been accepted for Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo. South  Africa’s has been adopted  
for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.  Mali’s for Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Congo,  
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.  Uganda’s for Burundi, Congo  
D.R., and Rwanda.  Ghana’s for Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  
Kenya’s for Somalia. Mozambique’s for Comoros and Madagascar.  Egypt’s for Djibuti, Ethiopia,  
and Sudan. Algeria’s for Lybia. Tanzania’s for Malawi.  
All enrolment derived with primary enrolment in Benavot and Riddle (1988), adjusted to all  
enrolment with the ratio of those aged 5-14 years to those aged 5-24 years, for Benin, Sudan, 1925- 
3 3; Cameroon, 1890-193 3; Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda  1920 -3 8; Côte  d'Ivoire,  
193 8; Egypt, 1890-1913; Gabon,  1925-3 8; Gambia, 1900-29; Kenya, 1920, 193 8; Lesotho, 1890- 
193 8; Mauritius, 18 80, 1929, 193 8; Mozambique and Zambia,  193 8; Namibia, Togo, 1913 -3 8; 
Reunion and Seychelles, 1900-38; Senegal, 1929-33;  
Botswana, 1955-60; Swaziland, 1955-65; Namibia, 1870-1913, 1950-80, assumed to evolve along  
South Africa; Zambia, assumed to evolve along Zimbabwe, 1870-1925. Botswana and Swaziland,  
1870-1938, assumed to be the same as  Namibia’s. Libya, 1920-38, assumed to be as  Morocco’s.  
Bahrein, 1950-70, and Brunei-Darassalam, Oman, Qatar, and UAE, 1950-80, assumed to evolve  
along Kuwait’s.  
All enrolment rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the  
population above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Angola, 1870-1950; Egypt, 1870-80;  
Kenya, 1870-1913; Madagascar and Zimbabwe, 1870-1900; Malawi, 1870-90; Mali, 1890-1938;  
Mozambique, 1870-1920; Tunisia, 1870-90; Uganda, 1870-1913;  
The Americas  
Puerto Rico, 1870-80, Newland  (199 1) 
Venezuela, 1870-90, Newland  (199 1). 
All enrolment derived with primary enrolment in Benavot and Riddle (1988) adjusted to all  
enrolment with the ratio of those aged 5-14 years to those aged 5-24 years, for Bahamas, Barbados,  
Belize, St Kitts, St Lucia, St Vincent, and Surinam, 1890-1938; Dominican Rep., 1870-1913;  
Ecuador, 1870-80; Guyana, 1870-1900.  
All enrolment rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the  
population above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Cuba, 1870-90; Honduras, 1870-80;  
Panama, 1870-90; Paraguay, 1870-80.  
Trinidad-Tobago, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Surinam, assumed to  
evolve along Jamaica’s over 1870-90.  
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Asia  
China, 1890-1913, assumes it evolved at the same pace as Hong  Kong’s.  
Population aged 5-24 (and 5-14) share in total population for missing countries.  Syria’s for  
Lebanon. China’s for Nepal.  
All enrolment derived with primary enrolment in Benavot and Riddle (1988) adjusted to all  
enrolment with the ratio of those aged 5-14 years to those aged 5-24 years, for Cambodia, 1920-38;  
Iraq, 1913-25; Israel and Laos, 1920-38; Lebanon, 1920; Philippines, Taiwan, and Fiji, 1900; Syria,  
1900-20;  
All enrolment rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the  
population above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for India and Myanmar, 1870; Iran and  
Iraq, 1870-1900; Philippines and Syria, 1870-90; Thailand, 1800-1900; Turkey, 1870-80.  
Hong-Kong assumed to have evolved as China, 1955-80, and Kuwait as Iraq, 1950-60.  
Europe  
Italy, 1870, 1913, 1929, Conte et al. (2007).  
Portugal, 1880-1913, Reis (1993), primary enrolment.  
Spain, 1870-1985, Núñez (2005).  
Population aged 5 -24 (and 5-14) share in total population for Cyprus,  Turkey’s and Greece’s,  
weighted by the shares of Turkish and Greek in total population.  
All enrolment derived with primary enrolment in Benavot and Riddle (1988) adjusted to all  
enrolment with the ratio of those aged 5-14 years to those aged 5-24 years, for Czechoslovakia,  
1913; Denmark, 1870; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1920-38; Luxembourg, 1929-50; Malta, 1890- 
1950; Romania, 1870.  
All enrolment derived with primary and secondary enrolment in Lindert (2004) adjusted to all  
enrolment with the ratio of those aged  5 -14 years to those aged 5 -24 years (Mitchell 2003 c), for 
Ireland, 1870-1900; Italy, 1870; Portugal, 1920; Switzerland, 1870; UK, 1870-1900.  
All enrolment rates have been backwards projected with years of primary education for the  
population above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin (2009) for Bulgaria, 1870-80.  
Per Capita GDP  
Most data come from Maddison (2006, 2009) up to 1990, and Conference Board (2010),  
since 1995 (although sometimes for the  post-1950 period as it is in the case of China, since  
Conference Board has adjusted the estimates to the recent findings in the 2005 PPP round), and are  
expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Otherwise, for specific countries shown below,  
Maddison’s per capita GDP levels (usually for 1950) are projected backwards with volume indices  
of real per capita GDP.  
Africa  
Estimates for Sub Saharan Africa, West, East, and Central-South regions, 1913-38 come  
from Smits (2006). The West includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,  Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia,  
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  
and Togo. The East, Burundi, Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,  
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,Tanzania, Uganda,  
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Central-South, Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,  
Congo, Congo D.R., Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,  São Tomé and Principe, Sudan, Botswana,  
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  
Levels for each country within each Sub-Saharan region over 1913-1938 were derived by  
projecting backward per capita GDP in 1950 (from Maddison 2009) with Smits (2006) regional  
aggregate volume series. For the period 1870-1913,  I assumed Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,  
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Liberia, and Senegal evolved along  Ghana’s. For the rest of the countries I assigned the lower  
bound for per capita income (1990 $ 300) as their levels were around or below such level by 1913.  
This way I was able to derive income levels to combine with education and life expectancy indices  
into a human development index for each country. Once national HDI were obtained, I aggregated  
them again into Smits’ defined three regions, West, East, and Central-South, as the individual  
country values would obviously be highly arbitrary and conjectural.  
For Nigeria, 1870-1913, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002).  
For Algeria and Egypt, 1870-1950, and Ghana, 1870-1913, estimates come from Maddison (2006:  
577-8).. I interpolated levels for 1890, 1900, 1925, and 1938 for Algeria. I interpolated levels for  
Morocco and Tunisia in the years 1880, 1890, and 1900, and, then, 1925, 1929, 1933, and  193 8 by 
assuming that these two countries grew at the same pace as Algeria.  
For Egypt, 1870-1950, Maddison (2006: 577).  Pamuk (2006) and Yousef (2002) also provide  
estimates. The former figures match closely  Maddison’s estimates. The latter suggest too low levels  
for 1870-1913.  
For South Africa, 1913-1950, Nominal GDP, Stadler (1963); deflator, Alvaredo and Atkinson  
(2010). Population comes from Feinstein (2005: 257-8). 1870-1913, estimates for 1913 projected  
backwards with Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) levels.  
The Americas  
Data for twentieth-century Latin America comes from CEPAL (2009), from 1950 onwards,  
and from Astorga and Fitzgerald  (199 8) and Astorga et al. (2004). Otherwise the sources are:  
Argentina, Della Paolera  et al. (2003), 1884-1950, assuming the rate of growth over 1870-84 was  
identical to that for 1884-90. The alternative option of projecting backwards the level for 1884 to  
1875 with Cortés Conde (1997) casts too low a figure. I assumed the level for 1870 was identical to  
that of 1875.  
Brazil, Goldsmith, (1986), up to 1950.  
Chile, Díaz, Lüders and Wagner (2007), up to 1950.  
Colombia, Kalmanovitz and López Rivera (2009) and data kindly provided by  Salomón  
Kalmanovitz in private communication, up to 1905; GRECO (2002),  1905 -50.  
Cuba, Santamaría (2005), up to 1902; Ward and Devereux (2009),  1902 -5 8; Maddison (2009),  
volume series from 1958 onwards. An important caveat is that Maddison (2006) level for 1990 has  
not been accepted. The reason is that given the lack of PPPs for Cuba in 1990 Maddison (2006:  
192) assumed its per capita GDP was 15 percent below the Latin American average. Since this is an  
arbitrary assumption, I started from Brundenius and  Zimbalist’s (1989) estimate of  Cuba’s GDP per  
head relative to six major Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,  
and Venezuela, LA6) in 1980 (provided in Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998) and applied this ratio to  
the average per capita income of LA6 in 1980 Geary-Khamis dollars to derive  Cuba’s level in 1980.  
Then, following Maddison (1995: 166),  I derived the level for 1990 with the growth rate of real per  
capita GDP at national prices over 1980-1990 and reflated the result with the US implicit GDP  
deflator to arrive to an estimate of per capita GDP in 1990 at 1990  Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Interestingly, the position of Cuba relative to the US in 1929 and 1955 is very close to the one  
derived with a different approach by Ward and Devereux (2009).  
Ecuador, 1870-1890, I assumed it evolved as Peru over 1890-1900 yielding $470 for 1890 and I  
arbitrarily assumed a per capita GDP of $400 for 1870-1880.  
Mexico, Coatsworth (1989), p. 41, for the nineteenth century. INEGI (1995), 1896-1950.  
Peru, Monasterio (private communication), 1896-1950.  I assumed the level for 1890 was the same  
as for 1896. I also arbitrarily assumed GDP per head for 1870-1880 was $400.  
Uruguay, Bértola (1998), 1870-1938.  
Venezuela, Baptista (1997), up to 1950.  
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Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua): I derived the  
level for 1913 by assuming the growth over  1913 -20 was identical to that of 1920-25, the latter  
derived from OxLAD database (Astorga  et al. 2003). 
Caribbean, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the  
Grenadines, and Suriname, Maddison (2006, 2009), Conference Board (2010), and Bulmer-Thomas  
(personal communication), 1950 onwards.  
Trinidad-Tobago, Maddison (2009),1950-70;  
Jamaica, Eisner (1961), 1850-1930; Maddison (2009),  193 8 onwards.  
Puerto Rico, Maddison (2009), since 1950.  
Canada, Urquhart (1993), 1870-1926; Statistics Canada (2004), 1926-1976.  
U.S., Kendrik (1961),1869-1953; BEA, since 1953.  
Asia 
Estimates for the Middle East, 1870-1913, Pamuk (2006). The countries included are Iran, Iraq,  
Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine (Israel), Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait,  
Oman, Qatar, UAE) countries.  
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